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1. Introduction 
In the Netherlands alone, 650 million animals are ‘produced’ each year to satisfy the human desire 
for eating meat. During their lives, these animals undergo gruesome practices, which include 
having their tails and beaks cut off and never being allowed to leave their small cages. After a short 
and miserable life, they are taken to the slaughterhouse, where they are relieved from their misery.  
Today, a cleavage seems to appear within Dutch society. On the one hand research shows that the 
meat consumption in the Netherlands is growing (Terluin et al., 2017). On the other hand more and 
more people question the above mentioned practices, which leads them to choose a flexitarian, 
vegetarian of vegan lifestyle (Dagevos, et al., 2012). For centuries, philosophers have questioned 
whether we can justify the sometimes horrible ways non-human animals are treated. The answers 
to their questions are important because of their far-reaching implications. If nothing can justify the 
fact that we treat animals as mere means to our ends, then this would mean the total abolition of 
eating meat, wearing fur and doing medical experimentations on animals. However, these 
practices are so imbedded in our current way of life, that abolishing them seems counterintuitive 
and moreover, downright impossible. Nevertheless, this debate is a very important one, since our 
current practices might turn out to be unjust and in need of drastic change. Thus, now more then 
ever, this debate needs to be kept alive and growing.  
Kant and some of the thinkers that developed his ideas, claim that human animals, but not 
nonhuman animals are the bearers of inviolable rights. According to them, the basic interests of 
human animals may not be sacrificed for the greater good of others. The basic interests of 
nonhuman animals, on the other hand, may be sacrificed for the greater good of others. For my 
thesis I want to investigate this Kantian view and one of its main opponent views: the Animal Rights 
Theories. Animal Rights Theories have been advocated by thinkers such as Francione (2008), 
Cavalieri (2001), Regan (1985) and Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011). They hold that at least some 
nonhuman animals have a moral status and are, therefore, subject to justice and bearers of 
inviolable rights.  
In this thesis I will answer the following question: is selfhood a sufficient requirement for the moral 
status of beings? To answer this question I will set out the main arguments on either side of the 
Kantianism vs Animal Rights Theory debate (or the personhood vs selfhood debate). In chapter 2 I 
will shortly discuss another influential theory on the moral status of animals: utilitarianism. Peter 
Singer (1990), a well-known utilitarian Animal Liberation advocate, holds that an act or policy is 
morally right, when it produces the greatest happiness for the members of society. Thus, harming 
individuals may be justified, as long as it produces the greatest amount of happiness possible. 
According to Singer, humans and animals both have a moral status, but they do not bear inviolable 
rights. I will argue that this theory is not correct by showing that it is unable to account for the 
wrongness of sacrificing individuals for the good of others. I will then suggest that a more Kantian 
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type of respect for individuals is needed, which emphasizes that no person may be treated as a 
mere means to an end. 
In chapter 3 I will elaborate on the Kantian view, which proposes that persons should not be a 
mere means to an end, and that inviolable rights should protect them from being treated like this. 
Since, according to Kant, only humans count as persons, only they bear inviolable rights. Animals, 
on the other hand, are mere things, which implies that they can be used as mere means. I will 
refute this view by arguing that it is implausible and arbitrary and that it fails to protect the rights of 
those who need them the most.  
In the fourth chapter of my thesis I will defend Animal Rights Theories and I will argue that selfhood 
is a sufficient requirement for the moral status of beings. Since many animals (human and 
nonhuman) are selves, at least they should be granted a moral status. Finally, in chapter 5 I will 
summarize and conclude my thesis.  
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2. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarians argue that the consequences of an action determine whether this action is morally right 
or wrong. Actions that bring forth at least as much enjoyment and happiness as any other 
alternative are morally right, while actions that do not maximize enjoyment are morally wrong 
(Peterson, 2014, p. 79). If utilitarianism would be accepted, this would drastically influence many of 
our practices. Many people, for instance, agree that it is wrong for a politician to lie, even if this lie 
would lead to positive consequences for society. Utilitarians, however, look at these consequences 
to determine whether the lie was morally right or wrong. In their view, if the lie maximizes 
happiness, and if being honest would not maximize happiness, then lying is the best moral option 
(Peterson, 2014, p. 80).  
2.1. Utilitarianism’s founding father: Jeremy Bentham 
Utilitarianism was first comprehensively put forth by Jeremy Bentham in his Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). He defined utilitarianism according to his principle of 
utility, which holds that actions should be approved or disapproved by their tendency to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the stakeholder. On societal level this means that those policies and 
rules should be chosen which maximize the happiness of the largest group of stakeholders.  
Besides being one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism, Bentham was also one of the few 
thinkers of his time to recognize that a principle of equal consideration should also apply to some 
nonhuman animals. Bentham wrote: 
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights 
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The 
French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a 
human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It 
may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the velocity of the 
skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for 
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the 
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But 
a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more 
conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But 
suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, 1982 [1780/1789], 
chapter xvii, paragraph 6) 
As Bentham points out in this passage, he believes that the capacity for suffering is the necessary 
condition that gives a being the right to equal consideration.  
!5
With this statement he radically shifts away from those who claim that there are certain capacities, 
such as using language or maintaining family ties, that give moral status to humans but not to 
animals. According to Bentham, the capacity of suffering is the only capacity that should matter 
when morality is concerned. Thus, Bentham agues, animals that have the capacity for suffering 
should have a moral status. 
2.2. Peter Singer: A utilitarian approach to Animal Liberation 
Following the footsteps of Jeremy Bentham came Peter Singer, one of the most influential 
utilitarian thinkers of our time. Singer became especially famous for his work Animal Liberation 
(1990) where he advocates a utilitarian approach to animals and morality. Singer was also one of 
the first people to introduce the term speciesism. Singer describes speciesism as “a prejudice or 
attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species” (Singer, 1990, p. 35). According to Singer, speciesism, like racism and 
sexism, is an act of discrimination which should be condemned and avoided. 
  
Like Bentham, Singer (1990, p. 37) argues that the capacity for suffering and enjoyment are the 
only capacities that should matter when it comes to moral consideration. Singer advocates that 
there is no moral justification for refusing to take suffering into consideration, whether the suffering 
being is a human or a cat. Anyone who would take human suffering more serious, just because it is 
inflicted on humans, would be guilty of speciesism. According to Singer, the capacity for suffering 
and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all. It is for this reason that a stone, a mere 
thing that cannot suffer, has no interests, while a cat, who has a life that can go better or worse, 
does have interests (Singer, 1990, pp. 37-42).  
Singer (1990) does not, however, believe that these interests should be automatically 
accompanied by some sort of “natural right”. Being a utilitarian, Singer emphasizes that an act is 
morally right, when it produces the greatest happiness for the members of society. Following from 
this, beings have the right to have their interests taken into consideration. They do not however 
have inviolable rights that will automatically protect them from all forms of suffering, or that will 
guarantee their happiness. This point becomes especially clear when Singer discusses animal 
experimentation. Singer argues that experiments performed on nonhuman animals probably cause 
less suffering than experiments performed on humans, because animals would not know that they 
have been kidnapped. Moreover, the animals will not know that the suffering will go on for a long 
time. Humans, on the other hand, do have this type of knowledge, which presumably increases 
their suffering (Singer, 1990, pp. 48-52). According to Singer, this does not mean that it is right to 
experiment on animals, but it does follow from this that there is a non-speciesist reason to prefer 
the use of animals over the use of humans for experimentation. Hence, according to Singer, animal 
experimentation can be justified in some very rare cases. However, he contends it would be 
equally justifiable to use a child with the same mental capacities as an animal (Singer, 1990, pp.
48-52). 
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2.3. Against utilitarianism 
The most common critics of utilitarianism try to prove, one way or another, that even though an act 
would bring forth the greatest amount of utility, it would be morally wrong to do this act. Thus,  they 
argue, utilitarian theory should be rejected (Peterson, 2014, p. 92). In this paragraph I will use an 
example to show that the propositions mentioned above are indeed right. It follows from this that 
the utilitarian approach to animals and morality, is not a sufficient one.  
- Even though an act would bring forth the greatest amount of utility… 
Image a doctor who, in order to save the lives of five people, needs five donor organs: a 
heart, a lung, two kidneys and a liver. Laying in a hospital bed, the doctor finds a patient 
who has all of these organs. The doctor euthanizes the patient so she can harvest her 
organs. With these organs she saves the lives of the five people, who leave the hospital 
happier than they ever were (for a similar example see: Foot, 1967, p. 5).  
- …it would be morally wrong to do this act. 
Justifying the killing of a healthy person, just because this would maximize utility, seems 
highly counterintuitive. Utilitarians have tried to defend themselves by stating that such an 
act would indeed be wrong, because it would lead people to loose trust in health care. This 
would have negative implications for the health of many people. Thus, according to these 
utilitarians, such an act is immoral (Peterson, 2014, p. 94). However, this does not fully 
grasp the intrinsic wrongness of ending someone’s life. As Regan so clearly puts it “death is 
the ultimate harm, because it is the ultimate loss - the loss of life itself.” (Regan, 2004, p. 
100). Indeed, killing a person is not wrong because of its side-effects for those who survive; 
killing a person is an immoral act in itself. 
- Thus, utilitarian theory should be rejected. 
Utilitarianism seems to be unable to account for the wrongness of sacrificing individuals for 
the good of others. This means that it is unlikely that utilitarianism will result in morally right 
acts. Therefore, utilitarian theory should be rejected. 
As Rawls puts it, utilitarianism seems to imply that humans are mere storage rooms of happiness 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 17). Within utilitarianism it is the happiness inside the box that counts; the storage 
box itself holds no value. The same logic could apply to other species. For utilitarians, a cat is a 
mere storage box of happiness. Killing the cat is wrong because it takes away her happiness, not 
because it takes away her storage box. This type of reasoning seems highly counterintuitive and its 
consequences would be dramatic. In such a utilitarian world a group raping might be justified since 
ten people are having fun, while only one is not. In a strictly utilitarian world, minorities might be left 
unconsidered if this would keep the masses happy. For a theory that focusses on the 
consequences of acts, the consequences of the theory seem rather destructive.  
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2.4. Conclusion chapter 2 
In this chapter I have discussed utilitarianism. I have argued that it is not an adequate moral theory 
because it does not account for the wrongness of killing or harming innocents. Therefore, a theory 
that morally considers the intrinsic value of beings seems to be necessary. A theory that values 
beings intrinsically and equally has been formulated by Immanuel Kant. His theory will be set out in 
the next chapter.  
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3. Kantianism 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, utilitarianism is unable to account for the wrongness of 
sacrificing individuals for the good of others. Therefore, it seems like we need a theory that 
respects individuals and emphasizes that no person may be treated as a mere means to an end. 
One of the most influential philosophers to develop such a theory, was Immanuel Kant. In the first 
part of this chapter I will briefly introduce the reader to some of Kant’s most important notions 
concerning the morality of humans and animals. In the second part of this chapter I will discuss 
whether moral consideration should be restricted to persons. I will argue that it should not.  
3.1. Classic Kantianism 
Kant’s theory is a deontological one. Deontological thinkers propose that our moral duties stand 
independent from their consequences. According to them it is not merely the consequences of an 
act that decide wether or not that act is moral (Nys, 2014, pp. 113-115). The morality of an act 
should instead be determined by the morality of the act itself. With this approach, deontology 
differs greatly from utilitarianism, which focusses on the consequences of an act to determine its 
morality (Nys, 2014, pp. 113-115).  
What Bentham is to utilitarianism, Kant is to deontology. Kant spent the most of his life trying to 
form a fundament for our moral beliefs (Nys, 2014, pp. 115-116). Kant (1997 [1785]) argued that 
everyone is always and in the same way subject to moral duty. He highlights that moral duties 
should be universally binding, just like the laws of nature. He found it unacceptable that some 
people are allowed to lie (because this would increase their happiness), while others are not. In 
other words, Kant emphasizes that the foundation of morality should be found in a principle that 
counts a priori, independent from its empirical consequences.  
3.2. The Formula of Humanity 
“So act that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (Kant, 
1997 [1785], p. 38) 
The above stated “Formula of Humanity” holds that a person should never be used as a mere 
means to an end, but always as an end in itself. This declaration is perhaps one of Kant’s most 
influential moral dictums. With it, Kant proposes that persons are not a mere means to an end. This 
does not imply that we can no longer ride a taxi because we fear to use the driver as a mere 
means. Obviously people rely on each other and in a sense ‘use’ each other all the time. The 
Formula of Humanity states that we cannot use the taxi driver as a mere means to our own ends. 
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Using the taxi driver as a mere means would be the case if I promise to pay him, but then leave the 
car without paying. According to Kant, such an act is immoral. 
3.3. Kant on the moral status of animals 
For Kant (1997 [1785], 4: 428), rationality is the capacity for normative self-government. As rational 
beings we are conscious of the principles on which we act and we are capable of assessing and 
judging those principles. According to Kant, rationality is a distinct human capacity that 
differentiates us from all other animals and he claims that it is this capacity that gives humans a 
moral status (Kant, 2010 [1798], 7: 127). Since animals do not have the capacity to judge their own 
principles, they cannot hold any moral obligations. Moreover, since they lack a rational nature, they 
are mere things that should not be considered as an ends-in-themselves (Kant, 1997 [1785], 4: 
428). Consequently, animals are not morally considerable, in the sense that humans do not owe 
them any direct moral duties. It would seem as if Kant hereby endorses the horrid ways in which 
some humans treat animals: if an animal is merely a thing, then why would anyone keep in mind 
their desires and fears? Indeed, some of Kant’s statements seem to point towards justifying this 
type of behavior. In his lectures on anthropology Kant writes:  
“The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely 
above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person….that is, a being 
altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with 
which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.” (Kant, 2010 [1798], p. 239) 
However, other works seem to incline otherwise. In the Metaphysics of Morals (1997 [1787]), for 
instance, Kant insists that there are moral restrictions in the ways we may use animals. He 
highlights, for example, that animals should not be strained or overworked beyond their capacities. 
Also, Kant underlines that it is permissible to kill animals for human ends, such as food and 
clothing. He urges, however, that the killing should be done as quickly and painlessly as possible. 
These moral restrictions are not duties that we owe to the animals, but rather duties we owe to 
ourselves (Kant, 1996 [1797], pp. 192-193). According to Kant, we, as humans, must show 
kindness to animals, because it is a duty by which to promote our own moral perfection. Kant 
writes: 
“…violent and cruel treatment of animals is…intimately opposed to a human being’s 
duty to himself…; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens 
and gradually uproots a natural disposition that is very serviceable to morality in 
one’s relations with other people.” (Kant, 1996 [1797], pp. 192-193) 
According to Kant, we must be kind to animals because if we would behave unkindly we might 
become indifferent and apathetic to (human) suffering. Our duty to be kind is therefore not a direct 
duty towards the animal but an indirect duty towards ourselves. 
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Distinguishing between moral patients and moral agents 
The difference between direct and indirect duties, and to whom we owe them, becomes clearer 
when we make a distinction between moral patients and moral agents. Kant (1996 [1797], pp. 
192-193) proposes that since we cannot hold animals morally accountable for their deeds, we also 
do not owe them any moral consideration. When a dog bites an old woman, we cannot hold the 
dog accountable for this since it lacks the rationality and thus morality to know that this deed is 
wrong. According to Kant this logically implies that we as humans also do not owe the dog any 
direct duties or moral consideration (Kant, 1996 [1797], pp. 192-193).  
Some thinkers (see for instance: Regan, 2004, pp. 151-156) disagree with Kant in this respect. 
Instead they make the distinction between moral patients and moral agents. Moral agents can be 
defined as beings that fall within the category of persons. Because they are persons, they can 
make reflective choices about their actions. This means that they are not only subject to moral 
consideration, but they can also be held morally responsible for their own actions (Regan, 2004, 
pp. 151-156).  
Healthy adult human beings are usually considered such moral agents. This implies that they 
deserve to be protected against harm, and that they are held responsible when they harm another 
moral being. Moral patients on the other hand, are non-persons, or selves. Therefore, they are the 
recipients of moral consideration, but they do not have the moral responsibilities that come with 
personhood (Regan, 2004, pp. 151-156). Infants or dogs, for instance, might be considered moral 
patients. Similar to Kant’s account, I believe we cannot blame the dog for biting the old woman. 
However, contrary to Kant, I do not propose that this necessarily means that we do not owe the 
dog similar consideration as we do to moral agents. Why I have these beliefs will become apparent 
in the next chapter. 
3.4. What is a person? 
Now that I have explained Kantianism, I will argue why I believe that Kantianism, at least in its 
classic form, is not an adequate moral theory when animal rights are concerned. I will first 
elaborate on the concept of ‘personhood’. Then I will argue that it is arbitrary and implausible to 
limit moral consideration to persons. This implies that Kantianism in this sense, is an inadequate 
moral theory that takes away the rights from those who need them the most.  
In the Kantian sense a person is a rational being. A similar account of personhood has been held 
by Sapontzis (1981), who contends that persons are beings which are “(a) embodied; (b) animate; 
(c) emotive; (d) initiators of actions rather than reflexive, instinctual, or mechanical respondents to 
their environment and (e) capable of forming ideas about the world rather than being merely things 
in the world” (Sapontzis, 1981, pp. 607-608). In this sense, the conception of personhood regards 
certain characteristics that beings must posses in order to be considered persons. This conception 
is different from the conception that all humans are persons just because they are members of the 
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species homo sapiens. This conception appears to be inadequate because it seems unlikely that 
species membership in itself can be a determining factor for personhood.  
Consider the hypothetical situation in which intelligent aliens that possess just those characteristics 
mentioned by Sapontzis, visit earth. It seems arbitrary not to grant these aliens personhood just 
because they are not members of our species. As Peter Singer (1990) could argue, this type of 
reasoning would be speciesist. 
Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, I will use a conceptualization of personhood by Kant, extended 
with the characteristics that Sapontzis has recognized. In principle, every mentally healthy human 
being that has reached a certain age (the exact age might differ from human to human), carries the 
characteristics to be considered a person.  
3.5. Why moral consideration should not be restricted to persons 
As explained earlier, Kant states that only persons should have a moral status and that we only 
owe persons direct duties. Beings that do not qualify as persons, should not be granted this moral 
status and we only owe them indirect duties. In the following passages I will argue firstly that 
granting a moral status to persons only is implausible. Secondly, I will contend that Kant’s indirect 
duty view is arbitrary.  
The implausibility problem 
First of all, granting a moral status to persons only is controversial. Kant seems to underestimate 
animal nature. Kant views animals as mere things that only have value relative to human desires 
and purposes. As I will attempt to show in the fourth chapter, animals are much more than that. 
They might not possess all the necessary characteristics to be granted personhood, but that does 
not imply that they do not possess any valuable characteristics at all. Like persons, animals have a 
welfare of their own, meaning that they have a life that can go better or worse for themselves. 
Based on this, it seems implausible to claim that animals hold absolutely no value of their own.  
The arbitrariness problem 
Secondly, Kant’s indirect duty view is arbitrary. By Kant’s definition nonrational beings cannot count 
as persons, which implies that they hold no value of their own and that they count merely as a 
means. It follows from this that our duties towards them, are actually not duties to them, but are 
indirect duties to ourselves. We have this indirect duty because, as explained earlier, mistreating 
nonpersons could lead to apathy towards human suffering. Why this is an arbitrary argument on 
Kant’s side, has been rightfully explained by Regan (2004, pp. 182-185).  
Regan takes the following example to prove Kant’s arbitrariness considering the granting of moral 
value. Suppose that a person develops sadistic habits which lead her to torture a nonperson. 
According to Regan, it would be quite remarkable if this would lead to the mistreating of a person, 
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unless there is some resemblance between the two. If torturing the nonperson would lead to no 
reaction, it would be implausible that the person, who enjoys inflicting pain, would want to torture 
another person.  
Regan argues, that for the causal story to work we must suppose that nonpersons, like persons, 
can also suffer and that they react similarly towards this suffering. If their behavior is similar we 
must admit that their suffering is also similar. But if the suffering is similar, then we cannot non 
arbitrarily claim that causing suffering is only a violating act in the case of persons, but not in the 
case of nonpersons (Regan, 2004, pp. 183-185). If we make this claim, we would “allow a 
dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar cases” (Regan, 2004, p. 183). I argue, like Regan, that 
denying direct duties to nonpersons and not denying them to persons, even though the relevant 
aspects are the same, would lead to a highly arbitrary and unequal theory.  
Finally, as Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, pp. 25-32) have emphasized, proposing that only 
persons bear rights, would render these rights insecure for everyone. Some humans, like infants 
and severely brain-damaged people, do not have the rational capacities associated with 
personhood. Donaldson and Kymlicka even argue that every human possesses personhood at 
some point in their lives, but loses it at other points.  
This is indeed true, since humans might be born as nonrational babies, grow up as rational 
persons and die as nonrational demented elders. As Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, pp. 25-32) 
argue, granting a moral status to persons only, would defeat the purpose of human rights: namely 
to provide security to all selves, especially to those who are vulnerable. It seems that Kantianism, 
besides leading to an implausible and arbitrary condition for granting inherent value, also fails to 
protect the rights of those who need them the most. 
3.6. Conclusion chapter 3 
In this chapter I have discussed Kantianism. I have argued that granting a moral status to persons 
only is implausible and arbitrary. Also Kantianism seems to fail to protect those who need 
protection the most. Therefore, we need a theory that proposes another more convincing and more 
inclusive condition for moral consideration. I believe that The Animal Rights Theories offer such a 
condition. These types of theories have been advocated by many thinkers, such as Francione 
(2008), Cavalieri (2001), Regan (2004), Korsgaard (2009) and Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011). 
The framework of this type of theory will be set out in the following chapter. 
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4. Animal Rights Theories 
In the previous chapters I have argued that utilitarianism is not an adequate moral theory since it 
treats beings as mere means. We are in need of a theory that values beings in themselves, which 
is why I discussed the most influential of such moral theories, namely Kantianism. I believe that 
granting a moral status to persons only is arbitrary and implausible. Therefore, we need to seek a 
condition that is sufficient in determining which individuals should have a moral status and which 
should not. I propose that “selfhood” is such a condition. 
The viewpoint that selfhood is a sufficient condition for moral consideration has been advocated by 
a number of Animal Rights Theorists (e.g. Francione, 2008; Cavalieri, 2001; Regan, 2004; 
Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011; Korsgaard, 2009). Though all of these theories differ somewhat, 
their goals and implications are the same. The premise of Animal Rights Theorists is to show that 
inviolable rights are owed to all conscious or sentient selves, human or animal.  
In this chapter I will first discuss the concept of a self. I will argue that the subject-of-a-life criterion 
that Regan proposes is an adequate way to conceptualize selfhood. Then I will go on to discuss 
which animals (human or nonhuman) can be considered selves. I will discuss Regan’s viewpoint 
on this and argue that it is not adequate since it leads to an inconsistent distinction between selves 
and persons.  
After this discussion of selfhood, I will argue that selves deserve a moral status. To do this I will 
discuss the viewpoints of Korsgaard and Wood. I will argue that Korsgaard’s is more adequate. 
Finally I will discuss the most relevant objections that people might have against Animal Rights 
Theories. Some of these criticisms can easily be overcome while others seem more problematic 
and require more attention. In some cases however, this goes beyond the scope of my thesis. I will 
finalize this chapter with some concluding statements and a short discussion on the implications of 
Animal Rights Theories.  
4.1. What is a self? 
For Animal Rights Theorists, selves are all beings that are conscious and have a subjective 
experience of the world and themselves, which allows them to form desires and beliefs. Regan has 
an especially detailed conceptualization of selfhood, which he calls the subject-of-a-life criterion:  
“…individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, 
memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; and emotional life 
together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference-and welfare-interests; the 
ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychological identity 
over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well 
or ill for them…” (Regan, 2004, p. 243) 
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Regan stipulates that individuals who are a subject-of-a-life, hold inherent value and should not be 
viewed as mere means-to-ends. My thesis is similar. Why this is my belief will be discussed later. 
Regan’s conception of selfhood is an especially defensible one because like the definition I 
proposed for personhood, it relies on characteristics that go beyond species. Hence, the definition 
is not arbitrary or speciesist.  
Moreover, Regan’s definition of a subject-of-a-life, or selfhood, is satisfying because it includes 
more than merely being alive. This is an essential prerequisite for a conception of selfhood, 
because merely being alive or being conscious cannot be enough to hold intrinsic value. A plant is 
alive, but a theory that suggests that plants should have a moral status cannot be taken seriously.  
Clams and mussels are alive and might even be conscious of the sea in which they live. However, 
they hold no sense of the future and their life cannot fare well or ill for them. It does not make 
sense to morally consider an organism that does not care about what happens to it. Of course the 
latter example is a tricky one, since we do not know for sure whether clams are self-conscious or 
not. Therefore, we might consider giving them the benefit of the doubt. I will discuss this problem 
more thoroughly in the section where I discuss which animals should be granted selfhood. The 
point is however, that a proper definition of selfhood, which implies a certain intrinsic value, has to 
include more than merely being alive. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, the concept of selfhood 
will be equated with the subject-of-a-life criterion by Regan mentioned before. 
Selfhood differs from personhood mainly in that it is more inclusive. A cat might be a self when she 
possesses sentience and the ability to form beliefs and desires. This does not automatically mean 
that she is also a person. To be a person, she must meet the proper requirements for personhood.  
4.2. Which beings should be considered selves? 
After having conceptualized selfhood, comes a second difficult task: determining which beings are 
selves and which are not. The difficulty in this task lies in the fact that our knowledge of what goes 
on in the minds of animals and some humans is restricted. We are yet to invent a machine that 
allows us to look into the minds of chickens and dogs or babies and the mentally impaired. Until we 
invent such a machine, we need to try and seek other clues that allow us to see the world from 
their perspective.  
Being able to draw a distinct line between persons and selves and between selves and merely 
living organisms would be very helpful for any Animal Rights Theory, because it would make the 
theory much more useful in everyday situations. We could, for instance, draw a line in such a way 
that it would include chickens, but not clams. In that way, people could happily proceed eating 
clams, while staying away from chickens. A theory that does not draw a line is much more difficult 
to apply and might lead to undesirable situations, for instance, when someone interprets the 
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definition of selfhood in such a way that it does not include women or black people. Hence, 
drawing a line seems desirable.  
Regan is one of the thinkers who makes an attempt to draw a line. According to him, all mammals 
(human and nonhuman) from the age of one hold the necessary characteristics for selfhood, 
because they “have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including 
their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference-and 
welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychological 
identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill 
for them.” (Regan, 2004, p. 243). In my view Regan is partly right in stating this. Discussing each of 
these characteristics to show that mammals indeed have them, is beyond the scope of this thesis. I 
refer anyone who is interested in a thorough description of each of these characteristics, to the first 
three chapters of Regans The Case for Animal Rights (2004). For now I will only briefly discuss 
how Regan comes to his conclusion that animals have a welfare in the sense that they have a life 
that can go better or worse for them.  
Animal welfare 
Having a welfare presupposes a certain type of autonomy that enables an individual to form beliefs 
and desires and to act accordingly. Regan (2004) calls this type of autonomy preference autonomy. 
He writes: 
“…it is enough that one have the ability to initiate action because one has those 
desires or goals one has and believes, rightly or wrongly, that one’s desires or 
purposes will be satisfied or achieved by acting in a certain way.” (Regan, 2004, p. 
85) 
Normally functioning mammals possess the cognitive prerequisites for having beliefs and goals, 
once they reach a certain age. Multiple scientific studies support this assumption. Seth, Baars and 
Edelman (2005), for instance, argue that mammals have the essential neural processes associated 
with consciousness, or awareness. Other studies, by Panksepp (2004, 2005), have exemplified the 
neuro- and molecular-physiological bases of several core emotional systems. Finally, studies by 
Clayton et al. (2003) and Crystal (2009) suggest that mammals are capable of thinking about past 
and future events and act accordingly. According to Regan (2004), studies as mentioned above, 
show that mammals are capable of perceiving and remembering and forming and applying beliefs. 
Therefore, he suggests, it is reasonable to believe that they are capable of making preferential 
choices (Regan, 2004, pp. 84-86). Indeed, having preferences implies that these animals have a 
life that can go better or worse for themselves. Therefore, it can be said that at least these 
mammalian animals, once they reach a certain age, can be considered to be selves.  
Drawing the line 
Now that I have established that it is plausible that all mammalian animals of a certain age can be 
considered selves, there are two difficulties that still lie ahead. Firstly, I need to establish when an a 
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mammal becomes a self, and secondly I need to find a way to determine which non-mammalian 
animals   are selves.  
Though I agree with Regan that most mammals can be considered selves, I do not agree with the 
fact that he draws the line at the age of one. Drawing the line at a certain age for all animals seems 
highly arbitrary. Consider the differences between piglets and human babies. Mirror tests have 
shown that at 4-8 weeks pigs are already able to use mirrors to find hidden foods. Using mirrors is 
a capacity that is highly associated with complex cognitive processing, which indicates a certain 
level of awareness (Broom, Sena, & Moynihan, 2009). These cognitive capacities, together with 
the other necessary characteristics formulated in the definition of selfhood, suggest that pigs pass 
the test for selfhood at 4-8 weeks.  
Now let us consider humans. Mirror experiments have been conducted on newborn humans and 
their results seem to imply that newborns do not pass the test for selfhood (as I will argue later, this 
does not imply that we can just treat newborns as we please). On average, humans are able to 
recognize themselves at 5 months, suggesting that they might lack the necessary prerequisites for 
selfhood before that time (Bahrich & Moss, 1996). These examples show that animals and humans 
reach selfhood at quite different ages, thus drawing a line at one certain age seems arbitrary. 
Clearly, the distinction between humans and pigs is just one distinction amongst many others. A 
one year old elephant is just a baby, while a mouse may not even reach the age of one. In reality, 
the variety within the animal kingdom is so tremendous that it is impossible to draw a line at one 
certain age.  
So if we cannot draw the line at a certain age, then where should we draw a line? My suggestion is 
that as long as we do not find a more satisfactory way to draw the line, we have to rely on our 
intuitions. For these intuitions to have some accuracy and legitimacy we need to at least attempt to 
indulge ourselves in the lives and minds of animals. By observing them and relying on scientific 
findings from animal behaviorists, we can form intuitions and ideas that enable us to decide when a 
certain animal has reached the age at which it can be said to be a self. I propose a similar 
approach when it comes to determining which non-mammalian animals are selves. Scientific 
research, such those described above, combined with our intuitions, will need to determine which 
non-mammalian animals are selves and when they become this.  
Thus, drawing an exact line at one certain age, or one certain species, cannot be done right now. I 
realize that this might seem unsatisfying. However, just because this is unsatisfying does not mean 
that we should just draw a line at a completely arbitrary point, just because we so desperately want 
to draw a line. The latter seems at least as unsatisfactory as the first. So for now I will not draw a 
line at any distinct place and I ask my readers to determine for themselves which animals do and 
do not fall within the definition of selfhood. Personally I am convinced that at least all normally 
functioning mammals and some birds that have reached a certain age (the exact age depends on 
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the species), can be considered selves. In the next paragraph I will explain why selfhood implies 
moral consideration.  
4.3. Selves as morally considerable beings 
In the following paragraphs I will discuss why I propose that selfhood is a sufficient condition for 
moral consideration. To make my view clear, I will discuss and compare Korsgaard (2004, 2009) 
and Wood (1998, 2008). 
Korsgaard: a Kantian account for Animal Rights 
When Korsgaard (2004, 2009) discusses animals and morality, she works within the Kantian 
tradition. Nevertheless, she draws some radically different conclusions. In the following paragraphs 
I will briefly explain and discuss those conclusions.  
Korsgaard argues that those without normative, rational capacities share certain capacities with 
persons. According to Korsgaard, these capacities are often the content of the moral demands that 
persons make on each other. She writes: 
“what we demand, when we demand that recognition, is that our natural concerns – 
the objects of our natural desires and interests and affections – be accorded the 
status of values, values that must be respected as far as possible by others. And 
many of those natural concerns – the desire to avoid pain is an obvious example – 
spring from our animal nature, not from our rational nature.” (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 5) 
According to Korsgaard (2004, pp. 103-106), animals have inherent value because they matter to 
themselves. Hence, animal nature is an end-in-itself. I believe that Korsgaard is indeed right to 
write this, though I would like to replace the word “animal” with the concept “self”. Animals who fit 
the subject-of-a-life criterion have, amongst other characteristics, beliefs, desires and preference-
and welfare-interests. Like Korsgaard, I believe this means that their lives fares well or ill for them. 
Their lives do not merely matter for the utility of others, but matter for themselves. It is not 
rationality that determines whether we have an intrinsic value, it is the fact that we matter to 
ourselves that grants us this right. Therefore selves, whether animal or human, have an inherent 
value that is equal to ours. Since selves, as moral patients, have an inherent value, humans owe 
them direct duties. Thus, like Korsgaard stipulates (2004, pp. 103-106), I argue that by hurting an 
animal, we are not just harming ourselves, we are harming them. 
Wood: a Kantian account for Animal Welfare 
Another Kantian account on the moral status of animals has been formulated by Allen W. Wood 
(1998, 2008). He, however, does not go as far as claiming that animals have a moral status. 
Instead, he seems to propose a theory that endorses animal welfare rather than animal rights.  
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Even though Wood (1998, pp. 194-195) is a Kantian thinker, he does not find Kant’s arguments 
concerning our indirect duties to animals very satisfying. Instead, Wood proposes that a logocentric 
ethics should hold that “honoring rational nature as an end in itself sometimes requires us to 
behave with respect toward nonrational beings if they bear the right relations to rational nature. 
Such relations, I will argue, include having rational nature only potentially, or virtually, or having had 
it in the past, or having parts of it or necessary conditions of it” (Wood & O'Neill, 1998, p. 197).   
According to Wood (1998, 2008), we should respect rational nature in persons, but we should also 
respect rational nature in the abstract. This entails respecting fragments of it or necessary 
conditions of it, even where these are not found in fully rational beings or persons (Wood & O'Neill, 
1998, pp. 197-200). Examples of such beings, are small children or people who have severe 
mental impairments.  
Many animals also posses some recognizable fragments of rational nature. According to Wood, we 
should protect and respect those parts of animal nature which they share with humans, or persons. 
Hence, he does not go as far as claiming that animals should have the same rights as humans to 
protect their inherent value (Wood, 1998, p. 200). Wood (2008) remains unclear about which 
characteristics we should or should not value similar to human nature. He writes: 
“Some animals possess the capacity to care … This capacity is clearly a larger and 
much more immediate component of rational nature than the mere capacity to show 
a preference for moving in one direction rather than in another (as an insect does) 
or even the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Hence, from a Kantian standpoint 
there is reason to be concerned more about animals that are capable of caring 
about others than about animals that are not.” (Wood, 2008, pp. 102-103) 
Thus, according to Wood (2008, p. 102-103) the capacity to care is a relevant component of 
rational nature which should be valued, while the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is not. 
Therefore, he contends, we should care more about animals that can care than about animals that 
cannot. This is where I think Wood has gone wrong. Because even in persons, we do not merely 
value those characteristics that follow from their rationality. To do so would mean that it would be 
morally justified to inflict physical pain on a person. Surely, physical pain does not stem from 
rationality but from bodily systems.  
I doubt if Wood would endorse a moral theory that has such implications. I do not believe it can, 
under normal conditions, be morally justified to inflict pain on a person, because that person is an 
individual that has a life that matters to herself. Hence, I argue she has an inherent value that 
should be protected and respected. This value does not come from her rationality. It comes from 
the fact that she matters to herself. It would be inconsistent to limit this argumentation to merely 
human persons. To do so would indeed be speciesist. Thus, we should not merely value those 
characteristics that animals, or selves, share with humans. Animal selves matter in and for 
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themselves. They have an inherent value that is equal to that of humans. Therefore, we do need to 
go as far as claiming that animals should have rights.  
4.4. Criticisms on Animal Rights Theories 
In the following paragraphs I will discuss some of the most heard criticisms to rights theories in 
general and Animal Rights Theories in particular. 
First objection: the moral status of non-selves 
The first objection that people might have is one that I briefly mentioned before: namely the 
question of what to do with those beings that cannot be considered selves, but that intuitively seem 
to hold some intrinsic value. An example of such beings are a newborn babies (and possibly also 
fetuses). The objection lays the following forward: the Animal Rights Theory proposes that only 
selves have rights. Since newborn babies do not (yet) count as selves, they do not have any rights. 
Arguably, a moral theory that proposes such a thing cannot be adequate. Since the Animal Rights 
Theory proposes this, it is not an adequate theory. 
Regan (2004, pp. 319-320) formulates an answer to this difficult matter that is quite satisfying. 
Firstly, he recalls that the criterion of selfhood (the subject-of-a-life criterion) is a sufficient, not a 
necessary, condition for possessing inherent value and thus bearing rights. If a being does not fall 
within this theory it does not automatically follow that it must lack rights. Whether they possess 
rights remains an open question (Regan, 2004).  
Secondly, Regan highlights that though it is not obviously true that newborns have beliefs and 
desires, it is also not obviously true that they do not possess such attributes. Indeed, just as in the 
case of animals, babies cannot talk. This means we will never be exactly sure of what goes on in 
their minds. Regan then argues that precisely because we are so unsure about what goes on in 
their minds, the Animal Rights Theory advocates giving babies (and viable fetuses) the benefit of 
the doubt. We thereby at least view them as if they are selves and thus bearers of moral rights, 
even if this might imply that we give them more than they deserve (Regan, 2004, pp. 319-320).  
Note that Regan seems to step away from his previous statements about drawing a strict line at 
the age of one. For reasons I have previously given, I believe that he is right in doing so. Until we 
find a way that is more consistent and satisfying in determining who should be considered a self 
and who should not, we should best rely on our intuitions. When it comes to babies, I argue 
intuition does a sufficient job. Every normal, non-psychopathic human being, would intuitively 
argue that newborns have a moral status and should therefore bear moral rights. 
Second objection: saving your loved-ones 
A second objection might be that people will have trouble with choosing which person or animal to 
save from harm or murder, when one of those individuals is a loved one. In such a case, can we 
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really expect people to let their loved ones be hurt, just because the hurt inflicted on them would be 
less harmful than the hurt inflicted on the other? A theory that suggests such a thing would not be 
very appealing to anyone (Regan, 2004, pp. 315-324).  
Regan (2004, pp. 322-324) tries to overcome this objection by formulating “special considerations”, 
which give some leeway in these respects. Regan proposes that we take three of those 
considerations into account. First are those that involve duties and rights which arise from 
voluntary agreements (for instance promises or contracts, including relationships) or as a result of 
one’s position within an institutional structure (for instance those in the army). In these cases it can 
be morally acceptable to choose to harm others rather than harming your loved ones (Regan, 
2004, pp. 315-324).  
The second of such special considerations involve those who voluntarily engage in certain kinds of 
activities, including high-risk activities and competitive activities. In cases like these we can choose 
to override the rights of those inflicted in these activities, so that others, who did not opt for these 
activities, may be saved (Regan, 2004, pp. 315-324). It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to 
thoroughly explain why these considerations might count as special. Therefore, I will not be 
discussing them any further and I will not make any statements of whether I think they are right or 
wrong. The third type of special considerations, however, I do want to discuss. In m view, it is so 
fundamentally wrong, that it cannot pass by undiscussed. 
The third and final special consideration that Regan (2004, pp. 322-324) proposes involves the 
historical background leading up to an intervention situation. In some of these situations, he claims, 
the rights of the many may be overlooked completely if that group has violated the basic rights of 
the other involved individuals. So for instance, when we have to choose between killing 50 slave 
owners or killing 1 of their slaves, we must opt for the first. According to Regan (2004, pp. 
322-324), the 50 slave owners, having behaved as immoral as they did, lost their claim to be 
protected.  
This consideration, however, I find highly troublesome. Its implications would be dramatic, 
especially when you regard the fact that this special consideration also applies to human 
relationships with animals. Since a significant amount of people (indirectly) kill animals to eat them, 
they would all behave immorally, victimizing an animal every time they eat meat. But this does not 
imply that meat-eaters no longer deserve moral protection.  
The same goes for the slave-owner example. Though owning animals for their meat or slaves for 
their labor is horrible and immoral, the people who do this are not necessarily doing this because 
they lack morality. They do this because they have been raised to believe that what they are doing 
is good and morally right. Surely, culture or tradition cannot count as a moral justification. However, 
punishing those who do, by taking away their moral claim for protection, seems just as immoral. 
Thinking like this might even open doors for fanatic vegans to just kill off farmers so that their 
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animals can be saved from the butcher. Evidently, Regan could not possible think this is a 
desirable consequence of his theory. Hence, I argue that only the first two types of special 
considerations are even worthy of our attention.  
4.5. Conclusion chapter 4 
In this chapter I have laid out the framework of Animal Rights Theories. I conceptualized selfhood 
and tried to find a way to determine which animals count as selves. Furthermore, I have attempted 
to show why selves should be morally considerable and should thus be the patients of morality and 
protection. I finalized this chapter by discussing some of the most heard criticisms against the 
Animal Rights Theory. In the fifth and final chapter I will summarize and conclude my thesis.  
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5. Conclusion 
Kant and some of the thinkers that developed his ideas, claim that human animals, but not 
nonhuman animals should be morally considered as the bearers of inviolable rights. In this thesis I 
investigated this view and one of its main opponents: the Animal Rights Theories. I analyzed 
whether selfhood is a sufficient requirement for the moral status of animals. In this concluding 
chapter I will shortly summarize and discuss my main findings. I will finalize this chapter by briefly 
discussing some of the implications of my findings.  
In the second chapter of this thesis I examined utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that the morality 
of actions should be determined by their consequences. I argued that this is not an adequate moral 
theory because it does not account for the wrongness of killing or harming innocents. Therefore, a 
theory that morally considers the intrinsic value of beings seems to be necessary. Such a theory is 
more desirable because it prevents the counterintuitive justification of killing or harming innocent 
individuals. A theory that values beings intrinsically and equally has been formulated by Immanuel 
Kant. 
I discussed Kantianism in the third chapter. Kantianism is a deontological theory which holds that 
the morality of actions should be determined by the morality of the actions themselves. Also, Kant 
contends that persons should never be used a mere means to and end, but always as ends in 
themselves (Kant, 1997 [1785]). Since non-human animals are not persons, humans do not owe 
them any direct duties. According to Kant, the only duties humans have towards animals, are 
duties that humans actually owe themselves (Kant, 1997 [1785]).  
I argued that even though Kantianism is a step in the right direction, it leads to an implausible and 
arbitrary way of granting a moral status to beings. Moreover, Kantianism seems to fail to protect 
those who need protection the most. Therefore, I proposed that we need a theory that offers a 
more inclusive condition for moral consideration. I believe that The Animal Rights Theories offer 
such a condition, namely selfhood. These theories have been advocated by thinkers, such as 
Francione (2008), Cavalieri (2001), Regan (2004), Korsgaard (2009) and Donaldson and Kymlicka 
(2011). 
In the fourth and final chapter of this thesis I laid out the framework of Animal Rights Theories. I 
conceptualized selfhood and tried to find a way to determine which animals count as selves. I 
argued that all beings that fit Regan’s (2004) subject-of-a-life criterion should be viewed as selves. 
These include at least all mammalian animals and some birds (the exact age at which these 
animals become a self depends on the species).  
The question I was hoping to answer in my thesis was whether or not selfhood is a sufficient 
requirement for the moral status of beings. I have attempted to show why selves should be morally 
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considerable and should thus be the patients of morality and protection. I argued that animal 
selves have a life that fares well or ill for them. Their lives do not only matter for the utility of others, 
but matter for themselves. The fact that animal selves matter for themselves, grants them an 
inherent value that should be morally considered and respected by rights and protection. Thus, 
based on my findings I conclude that selfhood is indeed a sufficient requirement for the moral 
status of beings. 
I understand that the implications of this theory are far-reaching and that it would be naive to 
believe that it will be accepted any time soon (if ever). I hope however, that my thesis has at least 
inspired some readers to critically think about their daily practices. Because ethics aside, there are 
many more reasons to stop, or at least limit, our current meat-consumption. The most important 
reason being our environment. So even if the reader is not convinced by my moral theory, I urge 
him or her to consider these others reasons. It will be my task to accept that pigs and monkeys will 
not be granted human rights any time soon. 
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